Side-channel attacks against Dilithium and countermeasures evaluation
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive study of side-channel attacks (SCA) and fault injection attacks (FIA) on lattice-based schemes, with an emphasis on the Dilithium signature scheme. The paper also examines a number of individual countermeasures capable of providing/improving protection against existing SCA/FIAs. The performance evaluation shows that the considered countermeasures cause a reasonable level of performance loss in real-world applications.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Ярослав Дерев’янко, Олена Качко (Автор)

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